The Behavior of Interest Rates and Real Exchange Rates During a Liberalization Episode: The Case of Chile 1973-83 by Sebastian Edwards
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE BEHAVIOR OF INTEREST RATES
AND REAL EXCHANGE RATES
DURING A LIBERALIZATION EPISODE:
THE CASE OF CHILE 1973—83
Sebastian Edwards
Working Paper No. 1702




A previous version of this paper was presented at the American
Economic Association Annual Meetings; Dallas, Texas; December
28—30, 1984.1 am indebted to Edgardo Barandiaran, Jainie de Melo
and Simon Teitel for helpful comments. Financial support from
U.C.L.A.'s International Studies and Overseas Programs and from the
National Science Foundation Grant SES 84 19932 is gratefully
acknowledged. All errors, however, are myown.The views pre-
sented here are my own and do not represent those of the World
Bank. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research
program in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those
of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Resea rch.The Behavior of Interest Rates
and Real Exchange Rates
During a Liberalization Episode:
The Case of Chile 1973-83
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the behavior of some key variables duringthe
recent economic liberalization reform attempted in Chile. The paper
concentrates on the behavior of the real exchange rate and nominal and real
interest rates during the period 1977—83. It is argued that as a consequence
of the liberalization of the capital account in Chile in 1979-81, dramatic
inflows of financial capital resulted. These capital inflows generated an
important increase in expenditure, and a lower relative price of tradables to
nontradables or real appreciation. Moreover, it is argued that it is the
liberalization of the capital account, and not the adoption of a preannounced
rate of devaluation, that generated the dramatic real appreciation of the
Chilean currency between 1979 and 1981 .Amodelto analyze interest rate
behaviorin a semi-open economy is also presented and applied to the case of
Chile. The results obtained suggest that during this period interest rates
respondedboth to open-economy and closed-economy factors. Among the former







The study of Chile's modern economic history usually generates a
sense of excitement and sadness. Excitement, because during the last 50 years
Chile has been a social laboratory of sorts, where almost every possible type
of economic policy has been experimented; sadness, because to a large extent
all these experiments have ended up in failure and frustration.
The most recent of these "experiments" began in 1973, after the
military overthrew President Salvador Allende. In the ten years following the
coup, the military implemented deep reforms directed towards transforming
Chile from an economy semi-isolated from the rest of the world, with strong
government intervention, into a liberalized world-integrated economy where
market forces were freely left to guide most of the economy's decisions.
These liberalization reforms were carried out at the same time as a major
stabilization program, aimed at reducing a 600 percent rate of inflation was
being implemented. Many of the policies undertaken roughly correspond to what
a vast number of economists have been advocating for developing countries --
tradewas liberalized; the capital account was (partially) opened; interest
rates were freed and an active domestic capital market was developed; the
fiscal system was reformed with a value added tax replacing a cascading type
sales tax; the social security system was reformed; and the private sector
began to play a more active role in the growth and development process.
This period was characterized by acute contrasts. For example, while
in 1973 Chile had the highest rate of' inflation in the world (600%), in 1981-2—
it had one of the lowest (9%).Onthe other hand, the rate of growth of real
GDP fluctuated drastically: it was —13 percent in 1975; it thenaveraged
almost 7 percent per annum during 1977-81; and became -15 percent in 1982. In
fact, the rapid growth of real GDP in Chile during 1977-81 and the apparent
success of other policies prompted some observers to (prematurely) talk about
the Chilean miracle. By the end of 1981, however,the euphoriacame to a
sudden end, as it became evident that the growth pace of the previousyears
was not sustainable. The inflow of foreign capital was halted, the foreign
debt could not be paid, real interest rates skyrocketed, and asevere finan-
cial crisis erupted. These events, and a drastic deterioration of theterms
of trade -—whichamounted to 26 percent between 1979 and 1983 --,provoked
one of the worst recessions faced by the country, from which, at the time of
this writing, it still has not fully recovered. In addition, a number of the
reforms were partially reversed:tariff rates were hiked; capital movements
were forbidden; the financial sector was plagued with bankruptcies, and was
virtually nationalized. 1/
A number of economic puzzles have emerged from thisexperience,
including the extremely high interest rates that prevailed throughout the
episode and the persistence of unemployment. Also, the ultimate failure of
the experiment has added considerable interest to the analysis. Here themost
relevant question ——whichhas far—reaching policy implications for other
developing countries --iswhether this failure was a consequence of the
liberalization policies themselves, or if it was the result of otherevents,
including foreign shocks and inappropriate macroeconomic policies.
In this paper, an attempt is made to provide some clues foranswering
this question. The analysis concentrates on some of the more controversial—3—
aspectsof the experiment ——openingof the external sector and real exchange
rate appreciation, interest rates behavior, and stabilization policies in an
open economy —-,andtries to extract some lessons of experience that could,
in principle, be applicable to other countries. This paper, then, does riot
provide a comprehensive account of the Chilean experiment with free market
policies. This is deliberate, since at this time a number of such general
interpretations are available, and the reader is referred to them. 2/ By
focusing on some specific --andespecially controversial —-aspectsof this
experience it is hoped that a better understanding of this episode will be
obtained.
The paper is organized in the following form. In Section I, the
behavior of the real exchange rate and its relation to the liberalization of
the capital account is investigated. A central question addressed in this
section is whether, as some analysts have pointed out, having fixed th
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in June of 1979 constituted a major policy
mistake. Section II deals with interest rates, and some plausible explana-
tions for their puzzling behavior are offered. Even though excha:ge rate and
interest rate behavior are intimately related I have decided to analyze these
issues separately, so that a clearer perspective can be obtained. In
Section III, some issues related to the Chilean stabilization program are
discussed.In this section I compare the military's monetarist. stabilization
program of 1973—83 with the only previous serious monetary-type stabilization
program in Chile -—theKlein-Saks Mission program of 1955-57. Finally, in
Section IV, some concluding remarks are offered.—'4--
I. REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL ACCOUNT
The behavior of the real exchange rate during the militaryexpeiiment
affected the developments of the Chilean economy inmany important ways. 3/
Betweenthe second quarter of 1979 and the second quarter of 1982 the
(effective) real exchange rate appreciated by approximately 25percent. This
real appreciation has had a central role in most interpretationsof the
Chilean crisis of 1982. In fact, a number of authors have claimedthat the
adoption of a fixed exchange rate in June of 1979 was a majorpolicy mistake
that provoked the real appreciation and, in conjunction with otherelements --
likethe full indexation of wages to past inflation —-generatedthe subse-
quent crisis. 14/ In this section the behavior of the real exchange rate is
analyzed,and it is argued that the main causeof the real appreciation was
related to the massive capital inflows that followed the liberalizationof the
capitalaccount in 1979. Some regression results reported providesupport to
this hypothesis. It isfurther argued that while the adoption of a fixed
rate—-atthe same time that wages were fully indexed to past inflation —-
wasa policy mistake, it was not amajor one.
InTable 1 quarterly data on the behavior ofthe effective real
exchangerate between 1977 and 198'4 are presented. An increase in this index
reflects a real depreciation, whereas a decline showsa real appreciation. As
maybe seen, between 1977 and the second quarterof 1979 -—inspiteof the
fact that the so—called tablita was tn effect ——therewas actually a slight
real depreciation of the peso. 5/ However, starting in the thirdquarter of
1979, and up to the second quarter of 1982 a continuous andsteep real—5-
appreciation was observed, which at the end of the first quarter of 1982 had
accumulated to 22 percent. In the second quarter of 1982, the fixed exchange
rate system was abandoned and a succession of devaluations followed. The
fixed rate was first replaced by a system where the exchange rate was pegged
to a basket. This was soon replaced by a floating system, which in turn was
quickly replaced by a crawling peg. This system is in effect at the time of
this writing. Between the abandonment of the fixed parity and mid-19811 a real
effective depreciation of almost 13 percent has taken place. 6/
Although the domestic capital market was reformed in early 1975 -—
withinterest rates being freed and the creation of new financial institutions
allowed ——foreigncapital flows were strictly controlled until mid—1979. In
June of that year a process of liberalization of the capital account of the
balance of payments was begun; restrictions on medium- and long-run capital
movements were lifted. The final steps in this process were taken in April of
1980 when additional regulations regarding the maximum monthly inflow of
foreign capital were relaxed. 7/ Short-term capital movements, however, were
forbidden throughout most of the experiment. In July of 1982, and for a brief
period of time thereafter, short—term inflows were also allowed.
Even though throughout most of the experiment only medium- and long-
term capital movements were permitted, the opening of the capital account
resulted in extremely large inflows of foreign capital. In 1980, capital
inflows more than doubled with respect to 1979, and in 1931 the level of
capital inflows doubled again. In Table 2, biannual data on net capital
inflows in U.S. dollars are presented for 1977 through 1982. The most
striking feature of these data is the very rapid increase in the net inflow in
the period 1978—81 and equally rapid decline in 1982. Most of the increased—6-
foreign indebtedness between 1979—81 took place through higher loans obtained
by the private sector without any government guarantees. For example, in 1979
the private sector obtained 98 percent of the foreign funds imported through
Article H of the Exchange Law. In 1980 that figure was 97 percent, in 1981
it was 98 percent and in 1982 it was 77 percent. Most of these funds were
obtained by the banking sector, which in turn loaned it to the final users.
Banks, however, were not allowed to take the exchange risk; all their loans
financed with foreign funds were documented in foreign exchange. The final
borrower was subject to the devaluation risk. These regulations generateda
highly segmented credit market, where only some agents had access to the
"relatively cheap" credit denominated in foreign exchange.
The massive inflow of foreign capital experienced between mid—1979
and mid-1981 was the main factor behind the real appreciation of thepeso. In
fact, the absorption of these foreign fundsrequireda real appreciation.
From an analytical perspective, the reason for this is that, to the extent
that a fraction of the net inflowing capital is spent on nontradablegoods, an
incipient excess demand for this type of goods will emerge; in order to
restore equilibrium, nontradable goods' relative prices will have toincrease,
and a real appreciation will result. 8/ This was indeed the case in Chile,
where a large proportion of the newly imported foreign capitalwas used to
finance a dramatic boom in the construction sector.
The fact that a real appreciatin is actually required to absorban
increase in the level of net capital inflows, introduces an important element
in the discussion of the Chilean experience. This means that the 1979—1981
real appreciation was a short-run equilibrium phenomenon. It was an
equilibrium phenomenon in the sense that, given the level of the capital—7—
inflows, the real appreciation was needed to maintain internal equilibrium in
the nontradable goods sector. On the other hand, it was a short-run
phenomenon, since the rate at which capital flowed into Chile between mid-1979
and mid-1981 was not sustainable in the long run. Once the nature of the real
appreciation of 1979—1981 is understood in this way, it becomes clear that the
adoption of a fixed rate in 1979 was not the main cause of the real apprecia-
tion. Independently of the exchange rate system, the absorption of a massive
inflow of capital would have required a real appreciation. This means that,
if instead of having pegged the peso to the dollar in June of 1979, Chile had
adopted a floating rate, the opening of the capital account carried out
between June of 1979 and mid-1980, would have resulted in a nominal, as well
as real, appreciation of the peso. 9/
However, it is important to notice that the rate of capital inflows
is an endogenous variable which, at least in principle, will differ under
alternative exchange rate systems. To the extent that these inflows respond
to interest rate differentials, it is likely that their magnitude would be
somewhat lower under floating or adjustable exchange rates. In the Chilean
case, however, the existing evidence suggests that for the 1979-1981 period,
capital inflows were not sensitive to changes in interest rate differ-
entials. Sjaastad, for example, reports that between August of 1979 and
December of 1980 there was a weak relationship between the rate of capital
inflows the domestic and foreign interest rates spread. Between January 1981
and March 1982 this relationship, however, basically disappeared. 10/ If
capital inflows didn't respond to interest rate differentials, what explains,
then, the massive inflow of foreign funds? A simple explanation is based on
the idea that immediately after the liberalization reforms, the perceived—8—
profitabilityof domestic investment --asseen from abroad -—increases
dramatically. This provokes a portfolio disequilibrium in thedeveloped
countries, since investors now want to hold a significantly higher fractionof
the liberalizing country's capital stock as part of theirportfolios. A a
result, immediately following the liberalization, capital inflows intothe
country will jump. As time goes by, however, and the portfolio imbalancein
the developed countries is solved, the flow of foreigncapital into the
country will slowly decline towards its new long-run equilibriun.
Alternatively, we can think that during the period of capital controlsa large
stock disequilibrium had developed, with the desiredlevel of foreign debt
well above its actual level. In this setting, once thecapital account is
opened, there is a tendency to solve this stock disequilibriumfairly fast.
This will result in massive inflows of foreign funds in theshort run. In
fact, short-run capital inflows will overshoot theirnew long-run
postliberaljzation level. This behavior of net capital inflowscan be modeled
in the following form: AK =mm[AK, e(D-D1)], where AK are actual
capital flows, AK is the maximum amount of net capital inflow allowedevery
period before the capital account liberalization. D* isthe desired or
sustainable level of foreign debt, which will depend on realpermanent income,
and real wealth among other things.D_1 is the actual stock of debt in the
previous period and e is a partial adjustment coefficient.Clearly, if
prior to the liberalization AK <e[D-D11 the gap between desired and
actual debt will increase through tine. Once therestrictions on capital
inflows are lifted, actual inflows willbecomeequal to O[D-D1J. That
means that, as with the alternative interpretation discussedabove,
immediately following the opening of the capitalaccount capital flows will—9—
jump to a fraction0 of the accumulated gap between the desired and actual
debt.As this gapis closed,the level ofcapital inflows will slowly be
reduced until it reaches a new equilibrium level. 11/ This was clearly the case
of Chile where during 1980-81 the inflow of foreign funds was extraordinary
and greatly exceeded its sustainable long-run level.
The existence of a fixed nominal exchange rate since June of 1979
made things even worse. First, the slow (approximate) convergence of domestic
inflation towards world inflation, after the exchange rate had been fixed,
generated additional forces towards a real appreciation. 12/ Second, and more
important, the coexistence of a fixed exchange rate and 100 percent indexed
wages made the adjustment required once capital inflows declined, extremely
difficult. The reason for this is that while the absorption of large amounts
of capital inflow requires a real appreciation, the reduction (or reversal) of
capital inflow requires a real depreciation to maintain equilibrium. As
reflected in Table 2, starting in late 1981 the rate of capital inflows
experienced a steep decline. Since the nominal exchange rate was fixed, the
adjustment of the real exchange rate required to cope with the lower rate of
capital inflows had to take place through a decline in the nominal price of
nontradable goods and of real wages. The problem, however, was that due to
the indexation mechanism incorporated into the labor law of 1979, real wages
were virtually inflexible downward. At this point it became apparent to most
observers that a fixed exchange rate and the real wages policy were highly
inconsistent, and that their coexistence represented a policy mistake. As
Sjaastad and others have indicated, these policies amounted to imposing two
mutually inconsistent numeraires in the economy. 13/ As a result of this
inflexibility in real wages, relative prices did not adjust. Instead, there—1 0—
was a significant adjustment in quantities, with output and employmentfalling
dramati cally.
A traditional way to have solved the crisis, which was advocatedby
some analysts, was to devalue the peso. The purpose of thismeasure, of
course, would have been to generate a real devaluation --animprovement in
the degree of competitiveness in the tradable goods sectorrequired to
reestablish equilibrium compatible with the lower rate of netcapital
inflows. However, due to the wage rate policy --andin particular to the
backward-looking indexatjori --itis highly likely that the nominal
devaluation would not have succeeded. As numerous historicalexperiences have
indicated, when wages are 100% indexed, nominal devaluations willusually be
fully translated into higher wages and prices, being self-defeating. Inthat
regard, an appropriate policy package at this point in time wouldhave
included the simultaneous abandonment of thewage indexation scheme and of the
fixed exchange rate system. The government, howeverreacted in a very
different way. Between the second half of 1981 and the first halfof 1982 a
passive policy was followed. It was argued that theeconomy would
automatically adjust to the new circumstances. 1LI/ In particular the economic
authorities strongly rejected the idea ofintervening in the labor and
exchange rate markets. It was argued at the time that the macroeconomic
adjustment would take place automatically andcostlessly through higher
interest rates, reduced expenditure and lower, andeven negative, inflation.
Interest rates did increase arid inflationwas somewhat reduced in the second
half of 1981. The magnitude of the resultingadjustment, however, was clearly
insufficient. The degree of real appreciation remainedhigh and real interest
rates climbed even faster. The level of domesticactivity plummeted in-11-
1982. The maintenance of a fixed exchange rate --inconjunction with fully
indexed wages ——constituteda policy mistake only at this time (1981-82),
when the reduction in the level of capital flows required a real depreciation.
Before late 1981, the fixed exchange rate did not constitute a serious
mistake.
The interpretation of real exchange rate behavior between 1977 and
1982 presented in this paper relies heavily on the alleged existence of a
negative effect of capital inflows on the real exchange rate; according to
this view higher capital inflows will generate a real appreciation of the
domestic currency. In order to investigate the extent of this relationship, a
regression analysis was performed. Reduced form regressions using quarterly
data for the period comprised between the first quarter of 1977 and the fourth
quarter of 1982 were run. In addition to the (lagged) rate of net capital
flows, other possible determinants of the real exchange rate like the terms of
trade and real growth were also included in the regressions. The following
results were obtained; where REER is the indexing of the real effective
exchange rate and the numbers in parentheses are t—statistics: 15/
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As may be seen, underbothspecifications, the coefficient of the
lagged value of net capital inflows is significantly negative as expected.
However, the value of the coefficient is not very large, suggesting that it
would take a significant change in the rate of capital flows -—asin Chile --
togenerate large variations in the real exchange rate. 16/ It can also be seen
from the results reported in equation (2) that the coefficients of theterms
of trade variable is negative as expected. The coefficient for realgrowth,
however, turned out to be positive and insignificant, suggesting that the
Ricardo-Balassa effect did not play an important role in determining the
behavior of the real exchange rate in Chile during this period.Finally the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable was fairly high under both
specifications, indicating that after a shock the real exchange rate moved
only slowly towards its new equilibrium. This is, in some sense, not
surprising given that these regressions were runusingquarterly data. In
sum,the results presented here provide support to the hypothesis that the
realexchange rate has been negatively affected by the rate ofcapital inflows
in Chile.
One ofthemost important consequences ofthe real appreciation of
the peso was that the tradable goods sector suffered an important loss of
competitiveness, and that a large number of firms ran into serious financial
trouble. Most of these firms faced these problems by resorting to heavy
borrowing from the financial sector, exercising a significantpressure on the—13—
demand for credit and on interest rates. As the magnitude of the real
appreciation increased, it became apparent for most economic agents that the
fixed exchange rate system was not sustainable. These beliefs fueled, towards
mid— and late 1981, expectations of a significant devaluation, which were
translated into even higher interest rates. In addition to the loss in
competitiveness generated by the real appreciation, the extremely high
interest rates and the depressed domestic demand, especially after 1981,
produced serious financial problems to most firms. 17/ The lack of government
supervision of the financial sector, and the close ownership relationship
between banks and large firms, made things even worse. In order to avoid the
firms' bankruptcy many banks made -—androlled over --loansthat, from a
purely financial viewpoint, were highly questionable. 18/ As a result, the
portfolio of bad loans in Chilean banks 'ew dramatically between 1981 and the
end of 1982. Of course, these rolling-over operations were not sustainable,
and in early 1983 the financial sector collapsed. The most important banks
had to be rescued by the government, which in early 1985 directly or
indirectly controlled (or owned) more than 70 percent of the banking system.
It. MONETARY POLICY, EXPECTED DEVALUATION AND INTEREST RATES
Interest rate behavior constitutes one of the most fascinating
puzzles of the recent Chilean experience. Throughout the episode both nominal
and real interest rates were very high. In fact most analysts have pointed
out that the persistence of these high interest rates played a crucial role in
the 1982 crisis. 19/ Table 3 contains quarterly data on borrowing nominal
interest rates, inflation, foreign interest rates (LIBOR) and the rate of-1 !-
devaluationfor 1977 through 1983. A striking feature of these data is the
fact that, even after the capital account was opened and the exchange rate was
peggedagainst the dollar in June of 1979, there was a substantial
differential between the domestic borrowing rates and the foreign (LIBOR)
rate. Only a small fraction of this differential can be explained by the
premium over LIBOR charged by the international financial community to Chilean
borrowers. The average premiumchargedto loans obtained by Chile was 1 .55
percentage points in1978;0.99 percentage points in 1979; 0.99 percentage
point in 1980; 0.89 percentage points in 1981; and 0.97 percentage points in
1982. 20/
The data on nominal interest rates presented in Table 3 refers to
average borrowing rates from the banking system. Throughout the period
lending rates were substantially higher. The spread between nominal lending
and borrowing rates --whichaveraged 22.7 percentage points in 1978, 22i
percentage points in 1979, 9i percentage points in 1980, and 11.1 percentage
points in 1981 and 18.2 in 1982 ——partiallyreflected the inefficiency of the
Chilean banking system, which had a much higher cost of operationsper unitof
deposits than banks of comparable size in the U.S. and other industrialized
countries. In Table Ltdataon spreads between lending and borrowing rates
between 197L1 and 1983 are presented.
Until mid—1979, when the process of opening the capital accountwas
begun,real interest rates were also extremely high. The real borrowing
interest rate averaged 8.8 percent per annum in 1977, 18.9 percentper annum
in 1978 and 13.2 percent per annum during the first half of 1979. The
(partial) opening of the capital account and the resulting large inflows of
foreign capital quickly impacted real interest rates; between the third—15—
quarter of 1979 and the fourth quarter of 1980 borrowing real rates declined
significantly, averaging only 14.1 percent per annum. Towards theendof1980
thesituation drastically changed. In December of that year the real
borrowing rate climbed to 15 percent per annum, while the real lending rate
exceeded 20 percent per annum. Things became even worse in 1981 ,whenthe
real borrowing rate reached an annual average of 27 percent, and the real
lending interest rate averaged 37 percent. In the first half of 1982,
immediately preceding the devaluation of the peso, the real borrowing rate
averaged 37 percent, while the real lending rate reached the remarkable figure
of 143.3percent.
Some possible explanations f or the behavior of interest rates have
beenoffered. Sjaastad, for example, argues that regulations forbidding banks
to operate in funds denominated in foreign currencies introduced exorbitant
transaction costs. According to him these costs explain the extraordinarily
high and stable spread between interest rates for peso—denominated operations
anddollar-denominated operations. 21/ Harberger, on the other hand, has argued
thatthe existence of a strong and evergrowing "false demand" for credit
playeda central role in the explanation of interest rate behavior. 22/ This
"false demand" consisted of the rolling-over of loans, which in turn, had
their origin in the privatization of alarge number of firms (previously
nationalized during President Allende's government) during the early years of
the military regime. These firms .iere auctioned to private conglomerates that
had to spend significant resources in order to operate, modernize and expand
these companies. Many of thesefirms didnot turn out to be profitable, and
increasinglyresorted to additional borrowing in order to stay afloat. As
pointed out above, at the same time banks ——whichhad a close ownership—16—
relation withthefirms -—continuedto roll over these loans in the hope that
in this way their bankruptcy would be avoided. Of course, this whole
operationwas only possibledue to the lack of supervision of the financial
sector. 23/
Other observers have mentioned the role of expected devaluation and a
higher country risk premium attached by the international financial community
to Chile, as possible elements that would explain interest rate behavior.
Still others have pointed out that the domestic monetary policy played a
crucial role in the rapid increase of real rates experienced since late
1980. In particular, ithasbeen argued that the so—called "neutral monetary"
policy, which was an important ingredient of the "automatic adjustment" macro-
economic approach followed by the economic authorities since late 1979,
resulted in unnecessary upward pressures on the real interest rate. In
connection to thisit isusually mentioned that between the second quarter of
1980 and the fourth quarter of 1981 the real value of the monetary base
declined by more than 18 percent. 24/ In this section a model that combines
some of these explanations is presented and tested. Also, a number of
analytical issues and lessons that emerge from this experience are raised.
11.1.NominalInterest Rates
In this subsection an attempt to empirically explain the behavior of
the nominal interest rate in Chile between 1977 and 1982 is made.
Traditionally, empirical studies onnominalinterest rates determination have
madeextreme assumptions regarding the degree of openness of the country under
study. It has usually been assumed that the economy in question is either
fully open to the rest of the world or that it is completely closed. These—17—
extremeassumptions, of course, are not applicable to most developing
countries, whose capital account is, in fact, subject to different types of
controls. In that regard most developing economies, including Chile during
the 1977—83 period, can be classified as semi—open economies.
A model for analyzing the process of interest rate determination in
the context of semi-open economies as Chile has recently been proposed by
Edwards and refined by Edwards and Khan. 25/ According to this model the
behavior of the domestic nominal interest rate can be captured by the
following set of equations:
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wherethe following notation has been used:
=nominalinterest rate frithe semi-open economy





=nominalinterest rate under assumption of fully closed
e conomy
r =actualreal interest rate in period t
p =long—runreal interest rate
¶rt =expectedinflation
EtSt =excesssupply for real money in period t
m =actualreal money
m =quantityof real money demanded in period t
=realincome in period t
=randomshock
and where p, A, a andare parameters.
Equation (3) states that the nominal interest rate in a semi-open
economy can be expressed as a weighted average of the values it would take
under the fully open and fully closed extremes. Parameter 'measuresthe
degree of financial openness of this economy; ifp=1equation (3)collapses
intothe interest arbitrary condition for a fully open economy, given by
equation (14).If,on the other hand, =0equation(3)becomesequal to the
Fisherclosed equation (5). A value of p between zero and one reflects that
this is a semi—open economy. The closer ipisto one the more open thi's
country will be to foreign influences on its financial sector. Equation (14)
is the traditional interest arbitrage condition. It is assumed that under
risk aversion there is a time varying risk premium term (Pt). Equation (6)
states that the real interest rates will negatively depend on the situation of
excess liquidity in the economy. With other things given, an excess supply
for real money (EMS>0) wilt exercise negative pressure, in the shortrun, on—19—
the real interest rate. In the long run, however, EMS=0 and r =
Equation(8) is the demand for real money. Finally, equation (9) depicts the
process through which monetary equilibrium is achieved.
Combining (3)through(9) the following expression form for the




ä2logm1+ 631og ÷ (10)
where6>0, 62>0, 63>0 6>0 and 62<0. 26/ The most important property of this
expression is that it allows both open and closed economy factors to influence
the domestic nominal interest rate in the short run. Indeed, the extremes of
fully open or closed economies are particular cases of this equation.
Moreover, the degree of financial openness of this country will be related to
the value of S. If and 62=63=6=0 (10) becomes the open—economy
interest arbitrage condition. In the Chilean case, however, it is expected
that in a regression analysis both the coefficients of (i÷D), i.e., 6i, and
of log m1, i.e., 62 will be significantly different from zero; this would
indicate that in Chile during the period under study both open-economy and
closed—economyfactors played an important role in the behavior of the nominal
interest rate.
The estimation of equation (10) presents a number of problems. First
data on the expected rate of devaluation have to be obtained. For the period
between 1977 and June of1979this canbeproxied by theactualrate of
devaluation.27/. Especially for the 1978 through mid—1979 period this is a
fairly uncontroversial assumption, since the actual rate of devaluation was
equal to the preannounced rate of devaluation determined by the tablita. On—20-
the other hand, between July of 1979 and June of 1982, the actual rate of
devaluation with respect to the U.S. dollar was zero. It is hard to argue,
however, that during this period the expected rate of devaluation was also
equal to zero. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that the
probability -—andexpected magnitude --ofdevaluation increased steadily
throughout the period. For example, Le Fort has determined, using Bayesian
methods, that the expected rate of devaluation increased from approximately 2
percent in July of 1979 ——onemonth after the parity was fixed --toover 26
percent in May of 1982, just prior to the actual devaluation of June of that
year. In this paper, and in order to test the relevance of the model
presentedabove, the following simplifying assumption regarding the expected
rate of devaluation during July 1979 and June 1982 wasmade:It wasassumed
that in every quarter the expected rate of devaluation can be proxied by the
difference, in percentage points, between that quarter'seffective real
exchangerate and the effective exchange rate prevailing in the second quarter
of 1979, when the peso was fixed to the dollar. Thismeans, then, that it is
assumed that the degree of real overvaluation of the peso relative to its June
1979 value provides a good proxy for the expected rate of devaluation.
Another problem related to the estimation of (10) has to do with the
definition of a time series of the expected rate of inflation. In orderto
simplify the estimation was replaced by the actual rate of
inflation. This is a reasonable thing to do under the assumption of rational
expectations. Andfinally, a third serious problem with the estimation of
(10) is related to the risk premium term Ideally onewould want to model
thisterm,which will generally depend on the stock ofoutsideassets ofthe
government and on other variables affecting the degree of country risk. This,—21 —
however,wasconsideredto be outside of the scope of this paper.
Consequently it was assumed that could be expressed as a constant k plus a
serially correlated random term = v. This means that in the
estimation of equation (10) a procedure that corrects for serial correlation
shouldbe used. Given the simplifying nature of these assumptions the results
obtainedfromthe estimation of (10) should be interpreted with caution.
Inthe regression a dummy variable that took the value of zero from
1977 to mid-1979 and the value of one form then onwards was introduced in
orderto allow for some distinction between the fixed and non-fixed rate
subperiods.The estimation of equation (10) using quarterly data for period
1977 through 1982 and using OL$ corrected for serial correlation, yielded the
following results, where as before the numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics










Theseresults are quite interesting. The fact that the coefricient
of (i+D) and of log mt_i are significant at conventional levels and have—22—
theexpected signs, provides some support to the hypothesis that during the
period under study the behavior of the nominal interest rate in Chile was
influencedboth by open economy factors andinternal monetaryconditions.
Thismeansthat interest rate determination in Chile should indeed be modeled
usinga semi—open economyframework.
In spite of the estimation's shortcomings the results reported jr-i
equation (11) point out towards three basic factors in the explanation of
nominal interest rates behavior in Chile:(1) nominal world interest rates;
(2) expected devaluation; and (3) real liquidity. 28/ In fact, during 1981,
while the world nominal interest rate and the expected rate of depreciation
increased, real liquidity, in at least some of its definitions, drastically
declined. These elements, then, provide an important guide for the
understanding of nominal interest rate behavior in Chile. Further refinement
of the model, however, should provide additional insights. In particular, a
more detailed consideration of the determinants of the risk premium ——which
nowhas been assumed to be equal to a constant plus an autoregressive term --
isa logical step towards the improvement of this model. Also, finding a
better proxy for the expected rate of devaluation would result in improved
estimates.
11.2 Real Interest Rates
Not only were nominal interest rates extremely high during the
Chilean experiment, but real rates were also dramatically high. As mentioned,
the partial opening of the capital account in mid—1979, and the resulting
increase in the rate of (net) capital inflows, generated an important initial
decline in real interest rates. This situation lasted for approximately 18-23-
months, until November of 1980. Towards the end of that year, however, a
sharp change was observed. During the year 1981, in spite of the fact that
net capital inflows reached a record high, averaging more than 1 .1 billion
dollars per quarter, real interest rates experienced steep increases. The
real borrowing rate was 22.9 percent in the first quarter of 1981, 26.3
percent in the second quarter, 27.9 percent in the third quarter and 32.8
percent in the fourth quarter.
What events can account for this abrupt change in the conditions in
the financial market? Obviously, a number of factors can be mentioned,
including the fact that this period coincided with the sharp increase in world
realinterest rates. Another explanation that has been advanced refers to the
fact that in 1981 Chile's rate of inflation was significantly reduced. 29/ For
agiven nominal rate, the argument goes, a decline in inflation results in
higher real interest rates. While this reasoning is evidently (tautologi-
cally) correct, it is clearly incomplete. In fact, it begs the question on
why wasn't the decline in inflation in 1981 accompanied by an equiproportional
drop in nominal rates? The discussion on the behavior of nominal rates
presented in the preceding section provides a partial answer to this. While
inflation finally caine down in 1981 to the level of world inflation, at that
time it became apparent that the prevailing rate of capital inflows was not
sustainable in the long run. This resulted in significant expectations of
devaluation which positively impacted the nominal interest rate without
affecting inflation in an equiproportionate way.
An approach similar to that used to discuss the behavior of the
nominal rate can be used to focus the analysis on the behavior of the real







Where rt is the real rate in this semi—open economy, r0 is the real
interest rate that would prevail in the extreme case of a fully open economy,
andris the real rate under the other possible extreme —-completelyclosed
economy. 0 is a parameter, equivalent to iinequation (3), related to the
degree of openness of this economy. If 0=1, equation (12) becomes equal to
theopen economy extreme (13); if 0=0 the fully closed economy equation
results. In the case of a semi-open economy, however, one would expect 0 to
be between zero and one. In equation (13) is the expected change in the
realexchange rate. The real exchange rate, in turn, is defined as
e =EP*/P,where E is the nominal exchange rate, P is the foreign price
level and P is the domestic price level. Equation (114), which is the real
rate equivalent to equation (6) above, is the actual real rate of interest in
period t. Equation (13) is of particular interest and relevance for this
discussion. 30/ It states that even under a completely open economy, with full
capital mobility, real interest rates need not be equal. Moreover, according
to this term if a real depreciation is expected (i.e., et>0) the domestic
real interest rate will exceed the world interest rate. Equations (12), (13)
and (14) can be combined to obtain an expression that provides some insights
for the understanding of the behavior of the real interest in Chile between
late 1980 and mid-1982:—25—
r Or +Be13—(l—8)A13÷ (l—O)p + (15)
According to this equation the domestic real interest rate can increase for
three reasons:(1) a higher world real interest rate; (2) a higher expected
rate of real depreciation; and (3) the creation of a situation of excess
demand for real liquidity in the econany (EMSt<0). All three elements were
simultaneously present in 1981—82. First, the world real interest rate --
measuredas the difference between LIBOR and the US CPI inflation --increased
by more than 7 percentage points between 1980 and 1981. Second, as Le Fort
has recently established, there is no doubt that starting in late 1980 and
duringmost of 1981 the expectations of a real devaluation increased
dramatically. 31/ These expectations were fueled both by the generalized
feeling that the external situation regarding capital inflows was not
sustainable and by the fact that in 1981 the terms of trade beganto turn
dramaticallyagainst Chile. Between 1980 and 1981 the effective real exchange
ratefurther appreciated by 12 percent. Finally, as pointed out in
Section II, starting in 1981 there was a large increase in the demand for real
liquidity, stemming (partially) from the bank's decision to roll over their
bad loans as a way to avoid (or more accurately, postpone) firms' bankruptcy.
III. MONETARISM NO4 ANDTHEN: THE KLEIN-SAKS MISSION VS.THE MILITARY REGIN
Inthis section the military governmentapproach towards stabiliza-
tionis compared to the only other sustained monetarist-type stabilization
program undertakenin Chile, during 1955—57. This comparison focuses mainly
onthe implications of the two different programsforreal exchange rate
behavior.The comparison of both episodes provides interesting insights—26—
regarding the evolution through time of rnonetarist thinking in Chile and Latin
America.Both experiments had a number of elements in common, and also some
key features that were radically different. In fact this comparison turnsout
to be quite instructive.
In 1955 inflation in Chile had reached what at the time was
considered to be an extraordinarily high level --814percent. The government
decided to seriously tackle the problem by implementing a long-term consistent
stabilization program. For this purpose a New York-based consulting firm was
hired, and in 1955 the Klein-Saks Mission began its work. The mission's terms
of reference stated that it should evaluate the causes of inflation and
external disequilibrium, and recommend a set of policies to combat these
problems. The approach taken by the mission can undoubtedly be labeled as
monetarist. It (correctly) traced the main cause of inflation to money
creation to finance the fiscal deficit, and recommended a package of monetary-
type policies that would work towards eliminating the underlying roots of
inflation. The mission's program was a qualified success. By 1957 the rate
of inflation had declined to 17 percent; the balance of payments had improved
and fiscal finances were in better shape. All in all, given the existing
political constraints, it is possible to state that the mission's achievements
were quite significant.
The similarities between the Klein-Saks Mission program and the
military program mainly refer to the diagnosis of the causes generating
inflation and the external crisis. Even though the initial conditions were
much worse in 1973 than in 1955, both programs correctly pointed out that the
creation of money to finance the fiscal deficit was the main cause of the
ongoing inflation. Both programs also emphasized Chile's weak external-27-
position and the inability of the public sector to efficiently mobilize
resources f or investment purposes. 32/
The two stabilization programsalsohad some important differences.
Two of them are worth pointing out within the context of the present pap4r.
First, contrary to the Klein-Saks program, one of the main features of the
military experience is that after the initial period, the stabilization
program not only focused on the traditional short-run anti—inflationary
elements present in any orthodox IMF—type of program, but also emphasized
long—run institutional reforms, whose purpose wastodrastically reduce the
government's role in the economy. Towards the late 1970s, the so-called
"modernization reforms," which introduced important structural changes, became
an integral part of the long—run development program, with most of these
reforms having actually been carried out by the end of 1981. 33/
A second major difference between both monetarist experiences refers
to the framework used for formulating the stabilization programs. While the
Klein-Saks experience was basically based on a closed-economy view of the
world, the new monetarism postulated that, after the trade reform, Chile was
an open economy subject to external shocks. The military stabilization
program was highly influenced by the simplest version of the monetary approach
to the balance of payments. In particular, there was great faith that in a
small open economy the different parity conditions would hold, even in the
short run. In fact, it was the belief that in an open economy the domestic
rate of inflation rapidly converges to the world rate of inflation (plus
expected devaluation) that prompted the economic authorities to base the
stabilization programs on the preannouncement of the rate of devaluation. As
a culmination of this policy the peso was fixed to the U.S. dollar in June of—28-
1979. However, this experience showed, once again, that the purchasingpower
parity condition does not hold in the short run; for several years the
domestic rates of inflation were significantly higher than the rate of world
inflation plus the rate of devaluation. As already argued, this plus th
opening of the capital account resulted in a major real appreciation of the
domestic currency, and in a significant loss of competitiveness of the
domestic sector. The situation was aggravated by the adoption of a 100
percent wage indexation law in 1979. Towards late 1981, when capital inflows
were substantially reduced, the adjustment of the economy required, a real
devaluation of the peso and a reduction of real wages, which wereprecluded by
the existing institutional arrangements, including the fixed exchange rate and
the indexatiori scheme. As a result, there was a significantadjustment in
quantities, with output and employment falling dramatically.
More specifically, the two experiences differed significantly with
respect to the (proposed) exchange rates and wage rate policies. As has
already been pointed out repeatedly, the military program opted for a fixed
exchange rate and fully indexed wages with respect to past inflation.
Regarding these two specific policies the Klein—Saks Mission madevery
different policy recommendations. The following quotations from the Mission's
report clearly illustrate this point: 324/
"[T]he Mission has held that automatic and obligatory readjustments of
salaries and wages are an important contributing factor in the
inflation. The Mission.. .advocated using wage policy as one of several
elements in reducing the rate of.. .price increases. Theeventual
objective of this policy was seen in the restoration of freedom of wage
negotiations.. ." (page10)—29-
Regarding exchange rates policy the Mission recommended:
"The Mission's concrete recommendations were based on the desirability of
establishing a single flexible exchange rate for all merchandise
transactions.. .While a free market for capital transactions wastobe
maintained..." (pages 11 and 12)
The suggestion of a dual exchange rate system, which differentiates
between financial and current external transactions is particularly
interesting in the light of the events of 1979-82, where the massive capital
inflows resulted in a steep real appreciation of the peso. In principle, this
kind of exchange rate arrangement tends to isolate the real side from real
exchange rate movements originated in the financial side of the economy. In
that regard under this type of arrangement the real appreciation resulting
from the liberalization of the capital account would have a reduced effect on
the real side of the economy. 35/
After comparing the stabilization programs of the Klein-Saks Mission
and of the military regime one is tempted to argue that if (regarding exchange
rates and wage rates) the monetarists of the 1970s had applied the policies of
the monetarists of the 1950s, the magnitude of Chile's current economic
problems would have been less severe.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What went wrong in Chile? This is a question with vast policy
implications for developing countries. In the 1970s Chile adopted a set of
policies advocated for a long time by mainstream economists for developing—30-
countries. For a while things worked out well arid a number of' experts
believed that Chilean approach would become the norm that developing countries
would try to emulate. 36/ In 1982, however, the experiment collapsed.
A number of things went wrong. However, it can be argued that the
crisis of the Chilean econany was not directly the consequence of the more
basic liberalization reforms. For example, it is clear that the collapse of
1982 was not related in any direct way to the fiscal reform of 1975, or to the
tariff lioeralizatjon carried out between 1975 and 1979, or to the reform of
the social security system. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the
way in which the financial reform was carried out --basicallywith no
supervision of the financial sector --playeda major role in determining the
magnitude of the crisis. Also, the timing of the opening of the capital
account of the balance of payments in 1979/80 ——whichgenerated wide swings
in the real exchange rate --wasill conceived.
It is in the sphere of macroeconomic management where the more
serious mistakes took place. In that respect, the reliance on an "automatic
monetary adjustment" towards late 1981 was particularly harmful. Also, the
combination of a fixed exchange rate with fully indexed wages created
important policy inconsistencies, which became particularly serious in late
1981 when the rate of capital flows dramatically dropped. It should be'
recognized, however, that foreign factors including the world recession and
the drastic reduction in Chile's terms of trade between 1980 and 1982.
Another area where the government policies were particularly deficient refers
to the capital accumulation process. Throughout the periodsavings and
investment was very low; in fact lower than its level in the 1960s. In that
regard it was quite apparent from the early stages of the economicrecovery—31 —
thatthe growth pace of 1977-80 was not sustainable in the medium and long
run.—32—
APPENDIX
Data Sources for Regression Analysis
Terms of Trade: Defined as price of exports relative to imports. The data
were obtained from Universidad de Chile.
Net Capital Inflows: Data obtained from Guillermo Le Fort, "The Real Exchange
Rate and Capital Flows: The Case of the Southern Cone Countries."
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California,
Los Angeles.
Interest Rates (it): Nominal borrowing rates paid by banks. Data obtained
from various issues of the Boletin, Banco Central de Chile.
Inflation: Rate of'changeof consumerpricelevel as corrected by Cortazar
and Marshall for 1975-79. For other years, data obtained from Banco
Central de Chile.
Exchange Rate: Data obtained from Banco Central de Chile.
Output: Quarterly data obtained from Universidad de Chile.—33—
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